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1.  Introduction 
 
From the early 1990s to the late 2000s, venture capital activity has varied considerably, both through 
time and across countries. After a slow start in the early 1990s, the second half of that decade was 
marked by an unprecedented boom in venture capital fundraising. After the bursting of the dot-com 
bubble in 2000, this boom was followed by several years of muted activity. Then there was a revival 
in the years 2005 to 2007, which ended when the recent global financial crisis hit. 
 
As is well known, the United States has the largest venture capital industry (Gompers and Lerner 
2001). What is less well known is that venture capital is also an important source of funding for young 
high-potential companies in many other countries. Examples include established industrial countries 
such as Australia, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, newly industrialized 
countries such as Hong Kong, Israel, Singapore and South Korea, emerging markets such as China 
and India as well as some developing countries such as Chile and Malaysia (Aylward 1999, Jeng and 
Wells 2000, Bottazzi and Da Rin 2002). 
 
So far, only few studies have analyzed the labor market effects of venture capital. This paper is the 
first to use a large sample of countries – in fact, no fewer than 78. By contrast, most previous papers 
use data from a single country, with a few using data from only 20 countries. Furthermore, our paper 
is the first to cover not just the boom and bust around the turn of the century but also the revival of 
venture capital fundraising during 2005-07. 
 
Our paper is also one of the first to focus on the macroeconomic side. By contrast, most previous 
studies use firm-level data. Such studies focus on the employment effects in venture-funded firms. 
They are unable to measure if venture capital benefits the labor market as a whole. 
 
Our paper also innovates because it uses an indicator of access to venture capital that has been used 
in one previous study only (Feldmann 2010). It is based on surveys among senior business executives 
and, as explained below, can help to shed new light on the effects of venture capital. Our paper goes 
beyond the Feldmann (2010) study not only because it uses a much larger sample of countries and 
data from more recent years. Additionally, in contrast to that study, the estimates for our venture 
capital variable presented here are fully robust to endogeneity. 
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The following section briefly discusses the transmission channels through which venture capital is 
likely to affect labor market performance. Section 3 summarizes the results from previous empirical 
studies. Section 4 describes our measure of venture capital availability. Section 5 explains our control 
variables. Section 6 describes our dependent variables, sample and estimation method. Section 7 
presents and discusses the regression results. Section 8 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Possible transmission channels 
 
Venture capital is likely to affect labor market performance through several channels. For example, 
improved availability of venture capital lessens firms’ financial constraints, enabling them to create 
new jobs. Usually, financial constraints are especially critical for young, new technology-based firms 
(Carpenter and Petersen 2002, Colombo and Grilli 2007). These are exactly the firms that venture 
capitalists target. In many countries, young firms and other small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) are also the firms that create most of the new jobs (OECD 2009). Thus by lessening financial 
constraints, venture capitalists also lessen an important constraint for the creation of jobs. 
 
Firms’ improvement in their financial situation often goes beyond the funds provided by venture 
capitalists, due to improved access to two other sources of funding. First, venture backing improves 
access to bank loans. For example, using data on 10,578 US companies over 1980 to 2000, Hellmann 
et al. (2008) find that having had a prior relationship with a company in the venture capital market 
increased a bank’s likelihood of subsequently granting a loan to that company, and that the relevant 
companies benefited from this relationship not only through more readily available loans but also 
through more favorable loan pricing. Second, venture backing improves access to the stock market. 
For example, using a sample of 350 American biotechnology firms financed by venture capital 
between 1978 and 1992, Lerner (1994) finds that venture capitalists were proficient at taking these 
companies public when equity valuations were high. Similarly, comparing 320 venture-backed IPOs 
with a matched control sample of 320 non-venture-backed IPOs in the US from 1983 to 1987, 
Megginson and Weiss (1991) find that the presence of venture capitalists served to lower the total 
costs of going public and to maximize the net proceeds. Using data on 136 venture-backed and 136 
non-venture-backed IPOs in the United States for 1976 to 1988, Jain and Kini (1995) find that the 
former exhibited relatively superior post-issue operating performance compared to the latter. Taken 
together, these four studies suggest that the venture capital industry acts as a catalyst for financial 
resources, enabling venture-backed firms to expand well beyond what that industry would be able to 
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fund on its own accord. As these firms are able to grow substantially using bank loans and the stock 
market as additional sources of funding, they are able to also substantially increase their staff, which 
in turn is likely to raise aggregate employment levels and reduce the unemployment rate in the 
economy. 
 
The support venture capitalists provide goes well beyond providing finance (e.g., Lerner 1995, 
Kaplan and Strömberg 2003, 2004). Additionally, they closely monitor the evolution of the firms they 
fund, provide their management with advice and help them hire the right experts, for example in 
marketing. Furthermore, they provide the firms with a network of contacts with potential suppliers, 
customers and “infrastructure providers” such as accounting and law firms. The reputation of being 
venture-backed helps firms to hire top experts and obtain new contracts. Also, venture capitalists step 
in and take control when times get difficult, removing the entrepreneur from his post as CEO, if 
necessary. All of this non-financial support helps venture-backed firms establish themselves in the 
market place and grow. As they increase their workforce, aggregate labor market performance 
improves. 
 
Venture capital is also likely to improve labor market performance because it helps to stimulate and 
commercialize innovation. For example, using data on 20 US manufacturing industries for the period 
1965 to 1992, Kortum and Lerner (2000) find that increases in venture capital activity in an industry 
are associated with significantly higher patenting rates. They estimate that venture capital may have 
accounted for 8% of industrial innovations during 1983-1992. Using a large database that comprises 
virtually all firms registered in the German trade register and applying matching procedures to 
compare venture-funded firms with non-venture-funded matched firms, Engel and Keilbach (2007) 
find that the former have higher numbers of patent applications. They also find that these are obtained 
before the venture capital investment and thus conclude that venture capitalists choose firms with 
proven innovation output. Similarly, using data on the US manufacturing industry for 1968 to 2001, 
Hirukawa and Ueda (2011) find that higher innovation is often positively and significantly related to 
future venture capital investment. Using data on 149 Silicon Valley high-tech start-ups from the 
period 1994 to 1997, Hellmann and Puri (2000) find that innovator firms were more likely to obtain 
venture capital than imitator firms. According to their results, venture capital was also associated with 
a significant reduction in the time to bring a product to market, especially for innovators. Higher rates 
of innovation and better commercialization of innovation are likely to improve labor market 
performance not only because the development and production of innovative goods create jobs but 
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also because innovations improve the international competitiveness of innovative firms and thus of 
the economy as a whole. 
 
Venture capital is likely to have positive employment effects not only in venture-funded firms but in 
other firms as well. First, consider the innovation channel. Other firms can benefit from innovations 
by venture-backed firms in various ways – for example, by producing goods that are complementary 
to the innovative goods; by providing services or intermediate products that venture-backed firms 
need in order to produce and sell their innovative goods; or by applying new production processes 
invented by venture-backed firms, thereby possibly improving their international competitiveness. 
Thus non-venture backed firms somehow involved in the innovation process are likely to prosper and 
take on new staff, magnifying the aggregate employment effect in the economy. 
 
The finance channel, too, is likely to trigger employment effects that go beyond venture-backed firms. 
This is because for potential entrepreneurs the odds of obtaining funding improve as a growing 
venture capital industry lessens firms’ financial constraints. Thus they are more likely to start a 
business, even if they initially do not use venture capital (Samila and Sorenson 2011). All newly 
founded companies create jobs, improving labor market performance. Of course, this is also true for 
firms that are not, or at least initially not, funded by venture capital. 
 
Finally, consider the “soft side” of venture capital. Venture capitalists provide venture-backed firms 
with a wealth of expertise on how to build a successful company as well as with various useful 
contacts. Often, this leads to spin-offs – i.e., to employees leaving to start their own business, taking 
advantage of the expertise and contacts acquired during their time at a venture-backed firm (Samila 
and Sorenson 2011). Because these spin-offs create jobs as well, they, too, contribute to improving 
labor market performance. 
 
 
3.  Previous empirical research 
 
As mentioned in section 1, of the few previous papers studying the labor market effects of venture 
capital, most use firm-level data. They combine data on venture-backed firms with data on similar 
non-venture-backed firms to estimate if venture funding affects the number of jobs in the former 
companies. The key limitation of these papers is that they are unable to measure the effects in the 
wider economy. As argued in section 2, these effects may be substantial. 
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Almost all previous studies find venture capital to positively affect employment. Let us start with the 
firm-level studies. Lerner (1999) analyzes the effects of the Small Business Innovation Research 
program in the US – a major policy initiative to support high-tech firms in which the government 
effectively acted as a venture capitalist. He finds that, between 1983 and 1995, program awardees 
achieved substantially greater employment growth and were significantly more likely to attract 
private venture financing than similar firms not assisted by the program. Davila et al. (2003) use data 
gathered in the period 1994-2000 on 193 venture-backed start-ups and 301 non-venture-backed start-
ups in the US, mostly Silicon Valley-based companies in technology industries. They find that the 
number of employees increased in the months prior to a venture capital funding round and accelerated 
in the months after the event. Bertino et al. (2011) use data from 1994 to 2003 on 538 start-ups in 11 
Italian high-tech manufacturing and services sectors. 58 of these start-ups were backed by venture 
capital. According to Bertino et al.’s (2011) estimates, venture capital investments had a large impact 
on employment growth, in most cases immediately after the first round of venture capital finance. In 
their study of German firms, Engel and Keilbach (2007) find that employment growth in venture-
funded firms was roughly twice as large as in non-venture-funded matched firms. The only study 
unable to find positive employment effects is the one by Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002). Using data for 
the years 1996 to 2000 on 511 companies listed on Europe’s “new” stock markets, these researchers 
do not find any impact of venture capital on employment growth in the period of (up to) three years 
after the IPO. 
 
Two studies use regional rather than firm-level data. The first, Jenkins et al. (2008), examines change 
in the share of high-tech employment in US metropolitan areas between 1988 and 1998. It finds that 
private venture capital firms had direct effects on the share of high-tech employment, along with 
technology grant and loan programs, research parks and military R&D. It also finds research parks to 
magnify the effects of private venture capital firms. The second study, Samila and Sorenson (2011), 
also uses data on US metropolitan areas, in this case covering the 1993-2002 period. It finds that 
investing venture capital in an additional firm stimulated the entry of two to twelve establishments, 
i.e., more new firms than actually funded. Additionally, it finds that a doubling in the number of firms 
funded by venture capital resulted in a 0.22% to 1.24% expansion in the number of jobs at the regional 
level. 
 
To date, there are few cross-country macro-level studies. Using data on 20 established industrial 
countries for the period 1986 to 1999, Belke et al. (2004, 2005, 2006) find that venture capital 
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investment tends to reduce unemployment and to raise employment. They also find the positive 
impact of venture capital investment on employment growth to be more dynamic than static in nature, 
hypothesizing that this may be because it takes time for venture capital investments to realize their 
full employment potential via feedback and trickle down effects on other firms. Feldmann’s (2010) 
paper covers the same 20 countries but a longer period, 1982-2003. In line with Belke et al. (2004, 
2005, 2006), he finds that more readily available venture capital is likely to have lowered the 
unemployment rate and raised the employment rate. Additionally, he finds that it is likely to have 
reduced the share of long-term unemployed in the total number of unemployed. According to these 
cross-country macro-level studies, the magnitude of the effects was substantial. For example, 
according to Feldmann (2010), in the US from 1982-83 to 1999-2000, the greater availability of 
venture capital might have caused the unemployment rate to fall by 0.9 percentage points, the 
employment rate to rise by 1.3 percentage points, and the long-term unemployment share to drop by 
4.4 percentage points. 
 
 
4.  Venture capital availability variable 
 
To measure access to venture capital, this paper uses results from the World Economic Forum’s 
annual Executive Opinion Survey (EOS). The respondents were CEOs or other members of 
companies’ senior management. In each country, on average 74 executives participated. The industry 
structure of the companies questioned corresponded largely to the industry structure of the relevant 
economy (excluding the agricultural sector). Also, care was taken to question companies of various 
size categories and types (e.g., private and state-owned, domestically oriented and internationally 
active enterprises).1 
 
The typical EOS question asks participants to indicate on a numerical scale to what extent they agree 
or disagree with a specific statement. After the survey was conducted, country-level average scores 
were calculated for each question. Table 1 contains the questions on venture capital availability used 
in the Executive Opinion Surveys. As can be seen from the table, all questions are phrased in a similar 
way. There are some slight variations but these are only refinements in style to make the questions 
                                                 
1 Over time, there have been some changes to the World Economic Forum’s surveys that are of minor importance to our 
analysis. First, between 1989 and 1995 the surveys were conducted in collaboration with the Institute for Management 
Development, Lausanne, and between 1996 and 2001 in collaboration with the Center for International Development at 
Harvard University. Second, the average number of respondents per country fluctuated somewhat from year to year; in 
our sample period the minimum was 57 (1993) and the maximum 94 (2005). Third, the number of countries covered 
increased substantially over our sample period, from 36 in 1992 to 131 in 2007. 
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more precise. Thus the responses to all questions can be used simultaneously. As the World Economic 
Forum applied different scales over the years, we re-scaled all scores to vary from zero to one (with 
higher values indicating that venture capital is more readily available). There is substantial variation 
in our measure, ranging from a minimum of 0.12 to a maximum of 0.90, with a sample mean of 0.46 
and a standard deviation of 0.16. 
 
The EOS data on venture capital availability have several advantages, especially compared with hard 
data such as the ratio of venture capital financed investment to GDP (used by Belke et al. 2004, 2005, 
2006). First, they are available for a much larger number of countries than hard data. Second, the 
EOS statements permit a better coverage of the overall process of venture capital financing, from 
“seed funding” to “bridge financing”. By contrast, as venture capital financing is not recorded 
officially and is often small-scale, a substantial part of it may have gone unrecorded in the hard data. 
Third, whereas the measurement of venture capital financing is not harmonized internationally, the 
EOS statements were the same for all countries. Fourth, the respondents have good knowledge of and 
often practical experience with the venture capital industry of their countries of residence. 
 
Potential drawbacks also have to be considered in connection with the use of the EOS data: 
– One cause for concern is that each respondent may have used his own yardstick when answering 
the questions. However, in the planning, implementation and analysis of the surveys, care was 
taken to ensure the use of a uniform yardstick. For one, the respondents were provided with a 
written explanation of the answering scale.2 Also, the answers were examined for robustness and 
consistency using various methods. In one of these checks, half of the answers from each country 
were randomly dropped from the sample. As the national EOS scores remained stable, they have 
obviously not been distorted by individual peculiarities in responding (e.g., Blanke et al. 2003, 
pp. 372-375). 
– Another potential drawback is that the answers may be distorted by the economic climate 
prevailing at the time the survey was conducted. For example, some respondents may answer 
more positively in a favorable economic climate. However, the country-level average scores are 
unlikely to be distorted in this way for three reasons. First, as mentioned previously, the national 
EOS scores remained stable when the World Economic Forum’s researchers randomly dropped 
from the sample half of the answers from each country. Second, the correlation coefficient 
between our ‘venture capital availability’ variable and the ‘GDP growth rate’ variable is small (-
                                                 
2 Blanke et al. (2003, p. 370) quote an example of the written explanation of the answering scale. It does not refer to a 
question on venture capital availability though, but to a question on the level of sophistication of financial markets. 
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0.05) and statistically insignificant. Third, we control for the impact of the economic climate 
(section 5). 
– There may be further reasons why the national EOS scores may not accurately reflect cross-
country differences in the availability of venture capital. For instance, respondents in a country 
may have a similarly biased assessment of the availability of venture capital if this topic has 
recently been discussed extensively and with a certain flavor in the media. Also, the questions 
may be interpreted differently in different countries. The authors of the Executive Opinion Surveys 
tried to avoid this problem by providing all respondents with a written explanation of the 
answering scale and by asking them to think in world terms rather than in national terms.3 
 
Thus although we cannot be sure that the EOS data accurately reflect the availability of venture capital 
in each and every case, it seems likely that they come fairly close to this ideal. Also, as pointed out 
previously, they have several additional advantages, especially compared with hard data. For these 
reasons, they can help to shed useful new light on venture capital and its effects on the economy. 
 
 
5.  Control variables 
 
We control for the impact of most major factors that have been found to affect labor market outcomes 
in large samples of countries (for definitions, sources and descriptive statistics of all variables, see 
Table 1). For example, we control for the impact of labor market regulation because strict regulation 
tends to increase unemployment and reduce employment (e.g., Nickell et al. 2005, Feldmann 2009). 
Furthermore, we control for the impact of income and payroll taxes, which are also likely to worsen 
labor market performance (e.g., Prescott 2004). 
 
We use two control variables to ensure that our ‘venture capital availability’ variable does not proxy 
for the financial system as a whole: ‘private credit’ and ‘stock market total value traded’. Countries 
with more highly developed financial systems are likely to have larger and more active venture capital 
industries. Indeed, there is moderate correlation between ‘venture capital availability’, on the one 
                                                 
3 It is possible that some respondents were not properly aware of venture capital availability in other countries. However, 
many respondents were from large and/or foreign-owned companies (see, e.g., Blanke et al. 2003, pp. 370-372) and were 
thus certainly able to think globally. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, the national EOS scores remained stable when 
the World Economic Forum’s researchers randomly dropped from the sample half of the answers from each country. Both 
facts suggest that limited ability to think in world terms, which may have been a problem for some respondents from 
small companies, is unlikely to have biased the national EOS scores. 
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hand, and both ‘private credit’ (correlation coefficient 0.61) and ‘stock market total value traded’ 
(0.57) on the other. 
 
Furthermore, we control for the impact of the real interest rate because a rise in the real interest rate 
tends to reduce investment and labor demand, thus lowering employment and raising unemployment 
(e.g., Fitoussi et al. 2000, Feldmann 2013). We also control for the impact of inflation. High inflation 
rates distort relative prices, hampering an efficient allocation of resources. Furthermore, as profits are 
mostly taxed on a nominal basis, enterprises’ real net return on investment decreases in an inflationary 
environment so that investment is likely to decline. Both effects may lead to lower employment and 
higher unemployment. Alternatively, if nominal wages are downward rigid, inflation may, upon the 
occurrence of shocks, facilitate the adjustment of real wages, improving labor market performance. 
Indeed, there is evidence for a permanent trade-off between inflation and unemployment at modest 
inflation rates in the United States (Akerlof et al. 1996, 2000, Groshen and Schweitzer 1999) and 
other industrial countries (Wyplosz 2001). 
 
We additionally control for the impact of trade openness. On the one hand, more openness to trade 
may lead to a more efficient international allocation of labor, increasing employment and lowering 
unemployment (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008, Felbermayr et al. 2011). On the other hand, 
there is evidence that it has adversely affected low-skilled workers in industrial countries (OECD 
2007). 
 
Because labor market performance is usually strongly affected by economic growth, we include the 
‘GDP growth rate’ variable throughout. We also use a dummy variable for wars because they may 
severely disrupt the labor market. For two reasons, we also include the ‘GDP per capita’ variable. 
First, to account for the effects of the large cross-country differences in the level of economic 
development. Second, as richer countries usually have more highly developed venture capital 
industries, it is important to ensure that our ‘venture capital availability’ variable does not proxy for 
the level of economic development. Indeed, there is substantial correlation between our variable of 
interest and ‘GDP per capita’ (correlation coefficient 0.70). 
 
In two robustness checks, we additionally use two alternative indicators of financial system 
regulation. The main reason to do so is to ensure that our ‘venture capital availability’ variable does 
not proxy (inversely) for the impact of this type of regulation because countries with stricter 
regulation of their financial systems are likely to have smaller and less active venture capital 
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industries. Indeed, ‘venture capital availability’ is moderately correlated with both ‘credit market 
regulation’ (correlation coefficient -0.49) and ‘financial sector regulation’ (-0.43). The second reason 
to control for financial system regulation is that some theoretical and empirical studies suggest that it 
can adversely affect labor market performance (e.g., Acemoglu 2001, Feldmann 2006). 
 
In one robustness check, we additionally control for the impact of product market regulation. 
Theoretical studies argue that anticompetitive product market regulations (e.g., entry restrictions, 
price controls) will generally reduce equilibrium output and thus labor demand and employment, 
increasing unemployment (e.g., Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003; Pissarides 2003). Indeed, several 
empirical studies find evidence for such adverse labor market effects (e.g., Bassanini and Duval 2006, 
Feldmann 2012). 
 
In another robustness check, we additionally control for the impact of legal restrictions on both 
international trade and international capital movements. Fewer restrictions of international trade can 
have the same opposing effects as trade openness.4 On the one hand, they may increase the efficiency 
of cross-country labor allocation, raising employment and reducing unemployment. On the other 
hand, they may trigger job losses due to increased import competition. Fewer restrictions of cross-
border financial transactions are likely to improve the efficient allocation of resources and attract FDI 
inflows, raising employment and reducing unemployment. However, they may also lead to erratic 
capital movements such as speculative in- and outflows or sudden stops, adversely affecting labor 
market performance. 
 
In our final two robustness checks, we examine the impact of terms of trade shocks and systemic 
banking crises, respectively. An adverse terms of trade shock could worsen labor market performance 
because a rise in relative import prices could increase wage pressure. As the recent global financial 
crisis illustrated, systemic banking crises can substantially worsen labor market performance. 
 
The variables exclusively used in some robustness checks are not included in the baseline 
specifications either because doing so would markedly reduce the number of countries and 
observations or because they are not normally considered in cross-country regressions of labor market 
performance. 
 
                                                 
4 Although ‘openness’ and ‘regulation of international trade’ are negatively correlated (-0.29), the absolute value of the 
correlation coefficient is low, indicating that they capture different aspects of international trade. 
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6.  Dependent variables, sample and estimation method 
 
To measure the effects on the labor market, we use both the unemployment and the employment rate. 
The unemployment rate is the most important and best-known labor market measure. However, for 
three reasons it may be insufficient to measure labor market slack. First, in some, particularly 
industrial countries, governments try to hide the true extent of unemployment by offering unemployed 
workers generous disability or early retirement benefits. Second, in many developing countries, due 
to very low or absent unemployment benefits a substantial number of de facto unemployed may not 
register or report as being unemployed, doing subsistence farming or working sporadically in the 
shadow economy instead. Third, in both industrial and developing countries, many people who want 
and are available for a job may have given up looking for one because their prospects of finding work 
are poor (e.g., due to insufficient or inadequate skills, long spells of non-employment or a general 
lack of job openings). For these reasons, we additionally use the employment rate. Both the 
unemployment and the employment data are based on labor force surveys and are harmonized to a 
large extent. 
 
As mentioned previously, our sample consists of 78 countries (Appendix). The sample period starts 
in 1992 for two reasons. First, there are gaps in the EOS data for earlier years. Specifically, while the 
World Economic Forum did not conduct a survey in 1985 and 1988, the 1991 survey did not include 
a question on venture capital availability. Second, data on some control variables (such as ‘stock 
market total value traded’) are unavailable before the 1990s. In general, with respect to both countries 
and years the sample size is determined by data availability only. 
 
We run two-stage least squares regressions of the following form: 
 
Second stage: 
𝑌𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑉𝑖 ,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑿𝑖 ,𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡   
 
First stage: 
𝑉𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝛽3 𝑉𝑖 ,𝑡−𝑠 −  𝑉𝑖 ,𝑡−𝑠−1  +  𝛽4𝑿𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜅𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 ,𝑡
2
𝑠=1
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Yi,t is a labor market performance variable of country i at year t, V denotes our ‘venture capital 
availability’ variable and X is a vector of our control variables. Country fixed effects in the second- 
and first-stage regressions are αi and γi, respectively. Year fixed effects are λt and 𝜅t, respectively, 
while the error terms are εi,t and ηi,t, respectively. While country fixed effects are included to control 
for the impact of unobserved country-specific characteristics, year effects are included to control for 
the impact of shocks that are common across countries. 
 
We instrument our ‘venture capital availability’ variable to extract its exogenous component. The 
instruments are lagged differences of the instrumented variable covering the previous three years. 
Lagged differences of the instrumented variable have been shown to be valid instruments, provided 
they pass a test for over-identifying restrictions and are sufficiently strong.5 To test for over-
identifying restrictions, we use Hansen’s (1982) J test. We also report the first-stage F statistic 
because Staiger and Stock (1997) proposed the rule of thumb that this statistic should take on a value 
of at least ten; otherwise the instruments are weak. According to the results from Hansen’s J test and 
the first-stage F statistic, our instruments are both exogenous and relevant, and thus valid (Tables 2 
and 3). 
 
To check whether random effects yield similar point estimates, we perform a further robustness check 
using random rather than fixed country effects. Random effects estimates have the advantage of 
exploiting both the cross-country and the time-series variation within the sample. By contrast, fixed 
effects estimates only use the time-series variation. We do not use the random effects estimator in our 
baseline specification because only “conventional” standard errors are available for this estimator in 
two-stage least-squares panel data estimation. Thus, in contrast to our fixed effects regressions, the 
standard errors from our random effects regressions are neither robust nor adjusted for clusters at the 
country level. 
 
 
7.  Results 
 
Tables 2 and 3 present our regression results. While Table 2 covers regressions to explain the 
unemployment rate, Table 3 covers regressions to explain the employment rate. In each table, column 
                                                 
5 This insight comes from, inter alia, research into GMM estimation (Arellano and Bover 1995, Blundell and Bond 1998). 
The latter is not an option in our case because it requires the number of cross sections to be much larger than the number 
of time periods as otherwise the estimates can be severely biased and imprecise (Roodman 2009a, 2009b). Thus we follow 
Roodman’s (2009b) advice to use a fixed effects estimator instead. 
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1 reports the results from our baseline regression while the other columns report the results from our 
robustness checks. 
 
The coefficient on ‘venture capital availability’ is statistically significant in each of our regressions. 
According to our estimates, more readily available venture capital is correlated with both a lower 
unemployment rate and a higher employment rate. In most robustness checks, the size of the 
coefficient is very similar to the estimate from the respective baseline regression. 
 
Our results suggest that, over our sample period, the effects of venture capital on labor market 
performance have been substantial. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the ‘venture 
capital availability’ variable is associated with a fall in the unemployment rate of between 1.2 and 1.8 
percentage points, ceteris paribus. It is also associated with a rise in the employment rate of between 
0.8 and 1.2 percentage points, ceteris paribus. These figures are based on the smallest and the largest 
coefficient on ‘venture capital availability’ from the regressions presented in Tables 2 and 3, 
respectively. Of course, they should be taken with a pinch of salt. Nonetheless, they exemplify that, 
between the early 1990s and the late 2000s, venture capital is likely to have had substantial effects 
on labor market performance around the world. Thus, in many countries, the fact that venture capital 
was much more readily available in the second half of the 1990s and, to a lesser extent, in the period 
2005-07 has probably contributed to the improvement in labor market performance during these 
years. Equally, the precipitous fall in venture capital availability from 2000 to 2003 has probably 
contributed to the decline in employment and rise in unemployment over that period. Our results also 
suggest that countries in which venture capital was more readily available have had better labor 
market performance than other countries, ceteris paribus. 
 
As argued in section 2, more readily available venture capital is likely to have improved labor market 
performance through several channels: by providing venture-backed firms with investments as well 
as with expertise and contacts of venture capitalists; by helping these firms to innovate and 
commercialize innovations; and by improving their access to bank loans and the stock market. 
Additionally, it is likely to have improved labor market performance by benefiting not just venture-
backed firms but other firms as well – for example, by involving them in the broader innovation 
process as well as by encouraging spin-offs and other business start-ups. As mentioned in section 2, 
in many countries young firms and other SMEs create most of the new jobs in the economy. 
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Our results accord with the previous literature on the employment effect of venture capital, which, 
apart from one study, also finds this effect to be positive (section 3). However, our study goes beyond 
all of these papers by using a much larger sample of countries and by covering more recent years. It 
also innovates, compared with most previous papers, by measuring the employment effect not in 
venture-backed firms but in the wider economy; by additionally measuring the impact on the 
unemployment rate; by using a new indicator of venture capital availability and instrumenting for it; 
and by controlling for the impact of most factors that have been found to affect labor market 
performance in large samples of countries. 
 
Finally, a brief comment on the results for the control variables (Tables 2 and 3). In line with the 
previous literature, we find a higher real interest rate to be correlated with both higher unemployment 
and lower employment, probably because it reduces investment and labor demand. Also in line with 
the previous literature, we find positive labor market effects of GDP growth. Higher GDP per capita 
is correlated with lower unemployment and higher employment too, suggesting that richer countries 
may be better able to integrate workers into the job market. A higher degree of trade openness appears 
to worsen labor market performance, perhaps because it increases import competition. In line with 
this result, we find stricter regulation of international trade to have a positive employment effect. 
Positive terms of trade shocks are associated with higher unemployment, perhaps because a rise in 
relative export prices potentially increases wage pressure. We find no, or no robust, effects of 
financial sector development, regulation, taxes, inflation, banking crises or wars. 
 
 
8.  Conclusion 
 
Our regression results suggest that venture capital affects labor market performance not just in some 
established industrial countries but in many countries around the globe. They also suggest that more 
readily available venture capital raises employment not just in venture-backed firms but across the 
economy. Furthermore, they suggest that it additionally reduces the unemployment rate. The 
magnitude of both the employment and the unemployment effect appears to be substantial. Our results 
are robust to both endogeneity of venture capital availability and variations in specification. 
 
Although the coefficient on our ‘venture capital availability’ variable is robust and although our 
results are consistent with most previous studies, more research is clearly warranted. In particular, 
the transmission channels from venture capital availability to labor market performance need to be 
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more closely analyzed, both theoretically and empirically. The policy implications need to be 
thoroughly discussed as well. For example, should the government subsidize young high-tech 
companies, possibly in co-operation with venture capitalists? Should it create research or business 
parks for such companies? Should it provide tax breaks for venture capitalists? Alternatively, rather 
than using targeted interventions like these, should the government confine itself to creating a 
business friendly environment for all companies – e.g., by reducing both business taxes and the 
regulatory burden to start, run and close a business? As our results suggest, the answers to these 
questions may have important implications for the performance of the labor market. 
 
 
Appendix. List of countries 
 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad & 
Tobago, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, 
Zimbabwe. 
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Table 1. List of variables 
 
 Definition Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. Source 
Credit market 
regulation 
Chain-linked subindex ‘credit market regulations’ of the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index, 
scaled to take values between 0 (least restrictive) and 1 (most restrictive). The subindex covers the 
following aspects: percentage of bank deposits held in privately owned banks, percentage of foreign banks’ 
license applications denied, foreign bank assets as a percentage of total banking sector assets, percentage of 
domestic credit consumed by the private sector, extent of interest rate controls, and prevalence of negative 
real deposit and lending rates. Because prior to 2000 the EFW index is available on a five year basis only, 
the author of this paper filled the gaps by linear interpolation. 
0.22 0.12 0.01 0.57 Gwartney and 
Lawson 
(2009), 
author’s 
calculations 
Employment 
protection 
legislation 
Indicator of the stringency of employment protection legislation. Regular contracts of unspecified duration 
after any trial period for the job. Unweighted average of measures for advance notice period and for 
severance payment, each of which in turn is based on averages across three lengths of service: after 9 
months, after 4 years, and after 20 years. Scores ranging from 0 (least restrictive) to 1 (most restrictive). 
0.35 0.16 0.00 0.75 Aleksynska 
and Schindler 
(2011), 
author’s 
calculations 
Employment rate Percentage of working-age population in employment. Age group: 15 years and older. Harmonized series. 55.48 8.60 33.90 82.90 ILO (2009) 
Financial sector 
regulation 
Index of regulation of the financial sector, scaled to take values between 0 (least restrictive) and 1 (most 
restrictive). The index is the unweighted average of six subindices. Five of them relate to banking: interest 
rate controls, credit controls, competition restrictions, state ownership, and quality of banking supervision 
and regulation. The sixth subindex relates to securities markets, covering policies to develop domestic bond 
and equity markets. 
0.18 0.16 0.00 0.78 Abiad et al. 
(2008) 
GDP growth rate Annual growth rate of real GDP; decimal fraction. 0.04 0.03 -0.13 0.18 IMF (2010), 
World Bank 
(2010) 
GDP per capita Gross domestic product per capita, in tens of thousands of constant 2005 international dollars, converted at 
purchasing power parity rates. 
1.79 1.21 0.02 4.80 World Bank 
(2010) 
Inflation rate Annual change in the consumer price index; decimal fraction. 0.07 0.23 -0.14 4.32 IMF (2010), 
World Bank 
(2010) 
Labor market 
regulation 
Chain-linked subindex ‘labor market regulations’ of the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index, 
scaled to take values between 0 (least restrictive) and 1 (most restrictive). The subindex covers the areas 
minimum wage, hiring and firing, centralization of collective bargaining, and military conscription. 
Because prior to 2000 the EFW index is available on a five year basis only, the author of this paper filled 
the gaps by linear interpolation. 
0.46 0.13 0.08 0.75 Gwartney and 
Lawson 
(2009), 
author’s 
calculations 
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Table 1. List of variables (cont.) 
 
 Definition Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. Source 
Minimum wage Statutory minimum wage as a decimal fraction of the mean wage. 0.32 0.22 0.00 0.87 Aleksynska 
and Schindler 
(2011) 
Openness Ratio of exports and imports of goods and services to GDP. 0.89 0.67 0.16 4.39 World Bank 
(2010) 
Private credit The value of credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to the private sector as a 
decimal fraction of GDP. Deposit money banks comprise all financial institutions (excluding the central 
bank) that have liabilities in the form of deposits usable in making payments. Other financial institutions 
comprise financial intermediaries that do not incur liabilities usable as means of payment. 
0.73 0.50 0.01 2.73 Beck et al. 
(2012) 
Product market 
regulation 
Index of regulatory impediments to product market competition. The index is scaled to take values between 
0 and 1, with higher values indicating stricter regulation. It covers the following three sectors, with each 
having the same weight: agriculture, electricity, and telecommunications. 
0.47 0.24 0.00 1.00 Ostry et al. 
(2009), 
author’s 
calculations 
Real interest rate The lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP deflator; decimal fraction. 0.07 0.14 -0.35 2.52 World Bank 
(2010) 
Regulation of 
capital account 
transactions 
Index of government restrictions on international financial transactions. The index is scaled to take values 
between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating tighter restrictions. The restrictions covered include multiple 
exchange rates, transactions taxes and outright restrictions on inflows and/or outflows specifically 
regarding financial credits. 
0.11 0.22 0.00 1.00 Abiad et al. 
(2008) 
Regulation of 
international trade 
Index of government restrictions on international trade. The index is scaled to take values between 0 and 1, 
with higher values indicating tighter restrictions. It is the weighted average of two subindices. The first 
subindex, which has a weight of two thirds, measures average tariff rates. The second subindex measures to 
what extent proceeds from international trade in goods and services are free from government restrictions. 
0.14 0.12 0.00 0.62 Ostry et al. 
(2009), 
author’s 
calculations 
Stock market total 
value traded 
The value of shares traded on domestic stock exchanges as a decimal fraction of GDP. 0.43 0.56 0.00 3.58 Beck et al. 
(2012) 
Systemic banking 
crises 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if, in the respective year, the country experienced a systemic 
banking crisis. A banking crisis is considered to be systemic if two conditions are met: first, significant 
signs of financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by significant bank runs, losses in the 
banking system, and bank liquidations); and second, significant banking policy intervention measures in 
response to significant losses in the banking system. 
0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 Laeven and 
Valencia 
(2008, 2010) 
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Table 1. List of variables (cont.) 
 
 Definition Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. Source 
Terms of trade 
shocks 
The difference between actual and smoothed terms of trade index as a decimal fraction of smoothed index. 
Smoothed index calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (λ = 6.25). The index used is the net barter 
terms of trade index, which is calculated as the ratio of the export unit value indices to the import unit value 
indices, measured relative to the base year 2000. 
0.00 0.04 -0.24 0.29 World Bank 
(2010), 
author’s 
calculations 
Top marginal 
income & payroll 
tax rate 
Subindex ‘top marginal tax rate’ of the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index. It is scaled to take 
values between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating higher marginal income and payroll tax rates and 
lower income thresholds at which the top marginal income tax rates apply. Because prior to 2000 the EFW 
index is available on a five year basis only, the author of this paper filled the gaps by linear interpolation. 
0.46 0.23 0.00 0.95 Gwartney and 
Lawson 
(2009), 
author’s 
calculations 
Unemployment 
benefits 
replacement rate 
Gross unemployment benefits as a decimal fraction of previous gross wage earnings; average for the first 
two years of unemployment. 
0.19 0.17 0.00 0.65 Aleksynska 
and Schindler 
(2011) 
Unemployment 
rate 
Unemployed as a percentage of the labor force. Labor force survey data. 8.08 4.86 0.90 36.00 European 
Commission 
(2009), ILO 
(2009), IMF 
(2010), OECD 
(2010) 
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Table 1. List of variables (cont.) 
 
 Definition Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. Source 
Venture capital 
availability 
Country-level average scores of survey responses from the World Economic Forum’s annual Executive 
Opinion Survey (EOS). The scores are scaled to take values between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating 
that venture capital is more readily available. In each country, on average 74 senior business executives 
were surveyed. The survey statements are as follows: ‘Venture capital is not readily available for business 
development (= 0), or is readily available for business development (= 100)’ (EOS 1992); ‘Venture capital 
is not readily available for business development (= 0), or is readily available for business development (= 
10)’ (EOS 1993, 1994 & 1995); ‘Venture capital is readily available for business development (1 = strongly 
disagree; 6 = strongly agree)’ (EOS 1996); ‘Venture capital is readily available for new business 
development (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree)’ (EOS 1997 & 1999); ‘Venture capital is readily 
available for new business and development (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree)’ (EOS 1998); 
‘Entrepreneurs with innovative but risky projects can generally find venture capital (1 = strongly disagree; 
7 = strongly agree)’ (EOS 2000); ‘Entrepreneurs with innovative but risky projects can generally find 
venture capital in your country (1 = not true, 7 = true)’ (EOS 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 & 2007). 
0.46 0.16 0.12 0.90 World 
Economic 
Forum (1996, 
1997, 1998, 
1999, 2000, 
2002, 2003, 
2004a, 2004b, 
2005, 2006, 
2007), World 
Economic 
Forum and 
Institute for 
Management 
Development 
(1992, 1993, 
1994, 1995) 
War Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if, in the respective year, there was a war on the country’s territory. 
The variable takes both wars between two or more states and internal wars (with or without intervention 
from other states) into account. 
0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 Centre for the 
Study of Civil 
Wars (2009) 
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Table 2. Regressions to explain the unemployment ratea) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Baseline 
specifica-
tion 
Random 
effects 
substituted 
for fixed 
effectsb) 
Alternative 
labor 
market 
regulation 
indicators 
Credit 
market 
regulation 
added 
Financial 
sector 
regulation 
and 
product 
market 
regulation 
added 
Regulation 
of interna-
tional trade 
and 
regulation 
of capital 
account 
transac-
tions added 
Terms of 
trade 
shocks 
added 
Systemic 
banking 
crises 
added 
Venture capital 
availability 
-8.22** 
(3.55) 
-7.53** 
(3.25) 
-9.55** 
(3.76) 
-8.15** 
(3.51) 
-10.95** 
(4.34) 
-10.81*** 
(3.87) 
-9.53*** 
(3.60) 
-7.80** 
(3.52) 
Private credit -0.12 
(0.96) 
-0.35 
(0.44) 
-1.59** 
(0.81) 
-0.09 
(0.94) 
-0.44 
(0.75) 
-0.52 
(0.71) 
0.26 
(0.86) 
-0.31 
(1.08) 
Stock market total 
value traded 
0.34 
(0.39) 
0.30 
(0.28) 
-0.02 
(0.44) 
0.37 
(0.39) 
-0.06 
(0.66) 
-0.11 
(0.61) 
0.34 
(0.39) 
0.33 
(0.39) 
Labor market 
regulation 
-0.68 
(1.82) 
-0.28 
(1.15) 
 -0.32 
(1.81) 
1.36 
(2.52) 
2.80 
(2.13) 
0.12 
(1.67) 
-0.56 
(1.82) 
Top marginal 
income & payroll tax 
rate 
1.10 
(1.74) 
1.77* 
(0.92) 
0.41 
(2.04) 
1.31 
(1.71) 
1.67 
(2.12) 
0.79 
(2.07) 
0.13 
(2.16) 
1.08 
(1.73) 
Real interest rate 4.95* 
(2.85) 
2.36* 
(1.35) 
4.69 
(3.09) 
5.23* 
(2.90) 
3.82 
(2.92) 
5.45* 
(3.14) 
4.28 
(3.27) 
4.60 
(2.98) 
Inflation rate -0.02 
(2.09) 
-1.96* 
(1.10) 
-0.85 
(2.53) 
0.76 
(2.02) 
1.57 
(2.16) 
1.76 
(2.46) 
-2.11 
(2.13) 
-0.51 
(2.39) 
Openness 2.67*** 
(1.00) 
2.15*** 
(0.64) 
1.99** 
(0.97) 
2.71*** 
(1.04) 
-1.23 
(2.30) 
2.14* 
(1.24) 
3.28*** 
(0.85) 
2.59*** 
(0.99) 
GDP growth rate -10.37*** 
(3.72) 
-12.25*** 
(2.91) 
-10.86*** 
(3.69) 
-10.19*** 
(3.75) 
-6.50* 
(3.65) 
-6.33* 
(3.26) 
-12.69*** 
(3.83) 
-9.68*** 
(3.39) 
GDP per capita -4.89*** 
(1.32) 
-3.36*** 
(0.63) 
-3.77*** 
(1.35) 
-4.98*** 
(1.32) 
-6.59*** 
(1.58) 
-6.08*** 
(1.41) 
-4.29*** 
(1.33) 
-4.90*** 
(1.30) 
War -0.14 
(0.73) 
-0.08 
(0.54) 
0.16 
(0.62) 
-0.10 
(0.71) 
-0.75 
(1.16) 
-0.50 
(1.25) 
-0.75 
(0.54) 
-0.08 
(0.67) 
Minimum wage   -2.71** 
(1.36) 
     
Unemployment 
benefits replacement 
rate 
  -0.73 
(2.35) 
     
Employment 
protection legislation 
  0.13 
(3.10) 
     
Credit market 
regulation 
   -2.93 
(3.58) 
    
Financial sector 
regulation 
    0.01 
(2.82) 
   
Product market 
regulation 
    -1.15 
(2.37) 
   
Regulation of 
international trade 
     -4.49 
(5.25) 
  
Regulation of capital 
account transactions 
     -1.91 
(1.22) 
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Table 2. Regressions to explain the unemployment ratea) (cont.) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Baseline 
specifica-
tion 
Random 
effects 
substituted 
for fixed 
effectsb) 
Alternative 
labor 
market 
regulation 
indicators 
Credit 
market 
regulation 
added 
Financial 
sector 
regulation 
and 
product 
market 
regulation 
added 
Regulation 
of interna-
tional trade 
and 
regulation 
of capital 
account 
transac-
tions added 
Terms of 
trade 
shocks 
added 
Systemic 
banking 
crises 
added 
Terms of trade 
shocks 
      4.34** 
(1.87) 
 
Systemic banking 
crises 
       0.45 
(0.47) 
Number of 
observations 
575 580 507 575 414 446 497 575 
Number of countries 66 71 55 66 51 55 53 66 
F statistic 8.61***  12.16*** 10.88*** 33.47*** 7.74*** 8.84*** 8.99*** 
Standard error of 
regression 
1.47  1.44 1.47 1.49 1.46 1.43 1.47 
Hansen J statistic (p 
value) 
0.20  0.57 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.27 
First-stage F statistic 14.10***  13.82*** 13.89*** 11.76*** 14.97*** 12.74*** 17.34*** 
 
a)Two-stage least squares regressions with country-specific fixed effects, except for regression 2, which uses generalized two-stage 
least squares with country-specific random effects. ‘Venture capital availability’ is instrumented; the excluded instruments are lagged 
differences of this variable covering the previous three years. Annual data for 1992 to 2007. All regressions also contain year 
dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Except for regression 2, they are robust and adjusted for clusters at the country 
level. ***(**/*) denotes statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%) level. 
b)The χ2 statistic from the Hausman test is 2.14. The p value from the Sargan statistic is 0.47. The Wald χ2 statistic is 225.10***. The 
Wald χ2 statistic from the first-stage regression is 284.32***. 
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Table 3. Regressions to explain the employment ratea) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Baseline 
specifica-
tion 
Random 
effects 
substituted 
for fixed 
effectsb) 
Alternative 
labor 
market 
regulation 
indicators 
Credit 
market 
regulation 
added 
Financial 
sector 
regulation 
and 
product 
market 
regulation 
added 
Regulation 
of interna-
tional trade 
and 
regulation 
of capital 
account 
transac-
tions added 
Terms of 
trade 
shocks 
added 
Systemic 
banking 
crises 
added 
Venture capital 
availability 
5.32* 
(3.15) 
4.85* 
(2.74) 
6.65** 
(3.27) 
5.64* 
(3.18) 
7.32* 
(3.76) 
7.38** 
(3.64) 
5.67* 
(3.37) 
5.43* 
(3.25) 
Private credit 1.05 
(0.99) 
1.14*** 
(0.39) 
2.56*** 
(0.97) 
1.01 
(0.97) 
1.05 
(0.96) 
1.04 
(0.84) 
0.70 
(0.96) 
0.97 
(1.01) 
Stock market total 
value traded 
-0.92** 
(0.39) 
-0.86*** 
(0.24) 
-0.67* 
(0.38) 
-0.95** 
(0.40) 
-0.60 
(0.52) 
-0.41 
(0.47) 
-0.91** 
(0.39) 
-0.93** 
(0.39) 
Labor market 
regulation 
1.82 
(1.66) 
1.64* 
(0.98) 
 1.34 
(1.56) 
0.97 
(2.36) 
-0.09 
(1.72) 
1.94 
(1.72) 
1.85 
(1.67) 
Top marginal 
income & payroll tax 
rate 
2.05 
(1.64) 
1.44* 
(0.78) 
3.06 
(1.87) 
1.80 
(1.63) 
2.06 
(2.19) 
2.24 
(1.86) 
3.10 
(2.04) 
2.05 
(1.65) 
Real interest rate -1.79 
(1.17) 
-1.71*** 
(0.64) 
-2.12* 
(1.11) 
-1.77 
(1.15) 
-1.21 
(0.88) 
-7.97*** 
(1.72) 
-1.54 
(1.09) 
-1.77 
(1.18) 
Inflation rate 0.32 
(0.38) 
0.34 
(0.40) 
0.35 
(0.34) 
0.06 
(0.39) 
0.06 
(0.39) 
-4.32*** 
(1.44) 
0.49 
(0.38) 
0.30 
(0.38) 
Openness -3.05*** 
(0.63) 
-2.76*** 
(0.57) 
-2.41*** 
(0.66) 
-3.13*** 
(0.69) 
-1.83 
(1.94) 
-2.64*** 
(0.67) 
-3.28*** 
(0.55) 
-3.11*** 
(0.63) 
GDP growth rate 7.54*** 
(2.53) 
8.08*** 
(2.40) 
7.83*** 
(2.46) 
7.56*** 
(2.59) 
5.65** 
(2.23) 
1.79 
(2.24) 
7.55*** 
(2.56) 
7.97*** 
(2.43) 
GDP per capita 3.58*** 
(1.26) 
2.72*** 
(0.56) 
2.99** 
(1.24) 
3.61*** 
(1.27) 
4.39** 
(1.88) 
4.82*** 
(1.42) 
3.50*** 
(1.32) 
3.58*** 
(1.27) 
War -0.16 
(0.32) 
-0.20 
(0.40) 
-0.41 
(0.28) 
-0.21 
(0.34) 
-0.07 
(0.56) 
-0.07 
(0.58) 
0.04 
(0.31) 
-0.15 
(0.33) 
Minimum wage   2.00 
(1.42) 
     
Unemployment 
benefits replacement 
rate 
  1.61 
(1.93) 
     
Employment 
protection legislation 
  5.18* 
(2.65) 
     
Credit market 
regulation 
   4.39 
(3.08) 
    
Financial sector 
regulation 
    2.63 
(2.11) 
   
Product market 
regulation 
    -0.63 
(2.10) 
   
Regulation of 
international trade 
     6.69** 
(3.39) 
  
Regulation of capital 
account transactions 
     1.50* 
(0.91) 
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Table 3. Regressions to explain the employment ratea) (cont.) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Baseline 
specifica-
tion 
Random 
effects 
substituted 
for fixed 
effectsb) 
Alternative 
labor 
market 
regulation 
indicators 
Credit 
market 
regulation 
added 
Financial 
sector 
regulation 
and 
product 
market 
regulation 
added 
Regulation 
of interna-
tional trade 
and 
regulation 
of capital 
account 
transac-
tions added 
Terms of 
trade 
shocks 
added 
Systemic 
banking 
crises 
added 
Terms of trade 
shocks 
      0.17 
(1.28) 
 
Systemic banking 
crises 
       0.19 
(0.35) 
Number of 
observations 
629 632 544 629 442 470 550 629 
Number of countries 75 78 59 75 55 58 62 75 
F statistic 7.47***  9.67*** 9.70*** 7.11*** 10.95*** 5.52*** 7.13*** 
Standard error of 
regression 
1.27  1.21 1.26 1.24 1.16 1.27 1.27 
Hansen J statistic (p 
value) 
0.29  0.59 0.21 0.18 0.37 0.12 0.23 
First-stage F statistic 13.49***  15.37*** 13.44*** 13.84*** 19.72*** 13.02*** 13.66*** 
 
a)Two-stage least squares regressions with country-specific fixed effects, except for regression 2, which uses generalized two-stage 
least squares with country-specific random effects. ‘Venture capital availability’ is instrumented; the excluded instruments are lagged 
differences of this variable covering the previous three years. Annual data for 1992 to 2007. All regressions also contain year 
dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Except for regression 2, they are robust and adjusted for clusters at the country 
level. ***(**/*) denotes statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%) level. 
b)The χ2 statistic from the Hausman test is 6.55. The p value from the Sargan statistic is 0.54. The Wald χ2 statistic is 198.40***. The 
Wald χ2 statistic from the first-stage regression is 301.35***. 
 
 
 
